The Multi-item Bisection Auction

Albin Erlanson ()

No 2011:31, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper proposes an iterative sealed-bid auction for selling multiple heterogeneous items with unit-demand agents. It generalizes the single item bisection auction (Grigorieva Et. al, 2007) to the environment with multiple heterogeneous items. We show that it elicits a minimal amount of information on preferences required to find the Vickrey-Clark-Groves outcome (Clarke, 1971, Groves, 1973, Vickrey, 1961), when there are two items for sale and an arbitrary number of agents.

Keywords: Bisection Auction; Multi-item; Unit-demand; Sealed-bid (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2011-10-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations:

Published as Erlanson, Albin, 'The Dou-Item Bisection Auction' in Computational Economics, 2014, pages 15-31.

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