It Wasn't Me! Visibility and Free Riding in Waste Sorting

Alessandro Bucciol, Natalia Montinari () and Marco Piovesan

No 2014:17, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Free riding problems can be more severe in multiple-person social dilemmas than in two-person dilemmas, since agents can hide their actions behind the veil of anonymity. In this paper, we use field data on waste sorting to study the effect of visibility in social dilemmas. We compare the sorting behavior of households sharing (or not) their bin for unsorted waste. Since households have to pay a fee proportional to their unsorted waste production, sharing the bin means sharing the fee. We find that, on average, household unsorted waste production is higher if three or more households share the same bin. Surprisingly, when only two households share the same bin, and therefore the household sorting behavior can be identified, unsorted waste production decreases compared to users not sharing the bin. Our interpretation is that shame and fear of punishment may play a role between the two sharing users.

Keywords: Social Dilemmas; Free Riding; Visibility; Waste Management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D78 Q53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2014-05-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: It Wasn't Me! Visibility and Free Riding in Waste Sorting (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2014_017

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