An Algorithm for Identifying Agent-k-linked Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities

Tommy Andersson and Lars Ehlers

No 2014:35, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains, and observe that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via agent-k-linked allocations. Given this observation, we provide an algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations.

Keywords: least manipulable envy-free rules; algorithm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D63 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2014-10-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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http://project.nek.lu.se/publications/workpap/papers/wp14_35.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: An algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations in economies with indivisibilities (2013)
Working Paper: An Algorithm for Identifying Agent-k-Linked Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities (2013)
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