Overlapping Multiple Assignments

Jörgen Kratz

No 2014:44, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies an allocation problem with multiple assignments, indivisible objects, no endowments and no monetary transfers, where a single object may be assigned to several agents as long as the set of agents assigned the object satisfy a compatibility constraint. It is shown that, on the domain of complete, transitive and strict preferences, group-sorting sequential dictatorships are fully characterized by four different combinations of coalitional strategyproofness, strategyproofness, Pareto efficiency, non-bossiness, group-monotonicity and group-invariance. It is also demonstrated that the characterization in Pápai (2001) of sequential dictatorships for the case where assignments are not allowed to overlap is contained in the main result.

Keywords: Multiple assignments; overlapping assignments; sequential dictatorship; strategyproofness; compatibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2014-12-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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