Decomposing the Afternoon Effect: An Empirical Investigation of Sequential Train Ticket Auctions

Ola Andersson and Tommy Andersson

No 2015:28, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: The afternoon effect, i.e., that prices in a sequence of auctions with identical items are decreasing with the order in which the auctions are terminated, is a frequently observed phenomenon in empirical auction studies. Using an unsurpassed amount of data from sequential online train ticket auctions, we investigate two hitherto unexplored dimensions inherent in sequential auctions, namely, the timing of auction ends and the presentation order of the auctions in a sequence. We find that both these dimensions are important for price formation in sequential auctions, but even when controlling for them, a sizable afternoon effect remains.

Keywords: sequential auctions; afternoon effect; presentation order; timing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2015-09-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ure
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Working Paper: Decomposing the Afternoon Effect: An Empirical Investigation of Sequential Train Ticket Auctions (2015)
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