Venting and Gossiping in Conflicts: Emotion Expression in Ultimatum Games

Margaret Samahita

No 2015:33, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Conflicts often lead to expression of emotion to unrelated parties. We study non-instrumental emotion expression in binary ultimatum games, where receivers can express emotion either privately or to a third-party audience prior to accepting or rejecting the offer. The possibility of emotion expression to an audience increases welfare, but this is driven by senders behaving more fairly rather than any change in receivers' behaviour. We thus show that the role of emotion expression in increasing co-operation is mainly driven by the punishment motive. There is demand for emotion expression even when it is unobserved, this is motivated by low self-esteem.

Keywords: ultimatum game; co-operation; emotion; fairness; self-esteem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D03 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2015-11-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-gth and nep-ore
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Published as Samahita, Margaret, 'Venting and Gossiping in Conflicts: Verbal Expression in Ultimatum Games' in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 2017, pages 111-121.

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Journal Article: Venting and gossiping in conflicts: Verbal expression in ultimatum games (2017)
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