Refugee Matching as a Market Design Application

Tommy Andersson

No 2017:16, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This note contains a few brief remarks on the similarities and differences between some standard market design applications (e.g., kidney exchange and school choice) and the refugee assignment problem. The main conclusion is that the refugee assignment problem is more complex in some dimensions than many of the standard market design applications. Consequently, classical mechanisms cannot be used to solve the problem and more research is needed to, e.g., understand how to model preferences, and how to define relevant axioms and multidimensional constraints.

Keywords: forced migration; asylum seekers; refugee assignment; matching; market design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 F22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6 pages
Date: 2017-08-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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