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Flexible Information Acquisition in Large Coordination Games

Alexandros Rigos

No 2018:30, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies how large populations of rationally inattentive individuals acquire information about economic fundamentals when, along with the motive to accurately estimate the fundamental, they have coordination motives. Information acquisition is costly but flexible: players freely choose how to correlate their signal with the fundamental, paying costs linear in Shannon mutual information. A characterization of the class of equilibria in continuous strategies is provided, without restricting the fundamental to follow a normal prior. Equilibria where the population-wide average action is an affine function of the fundamental exist only when the fundamental is normally distributed. A novel method that allows the study of non-normal priors is developed. Using this method, the paper demonstrates that small departures from normality can lead to distributions of equilibrium actions that differ significantly from those of Gaussian models. Such “distortions” can potentially explain highly skewed distributions of observed actions (e.g. prices) even if economic fundamentals are almost normally distributed.

Keywords: Coordination games; Beauty-contest; Flexible information acquisition; Rational inattention; Non-normal prior; Skew normal distribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 2018-11-07, Revised 2020-05-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-mic
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