Sweden's Constitution Decides Its Covid-19 Exceptionalism

Lars Jonung ()

No 2020:11, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: The Swedish policy response to covid-19 stands out as exceptional in international comparisons. The approach adopted is fundamentally determined by the Swedish constitution. Three articles of the constitution are central for this explanation. The first one guarantees the freedom of movement for Swedish citizens, thus ruling out the use of nation-wide lockdowns as an instrument in peacetime. The second one establishes independence for public agencies, allowing them to design and administer the policy response to the pandemic with a minimal interference by the central government. The third one reserves exceptional powers to local government, making a central response to the pandemic difficult to implement. In addition, the Swedish approach is fostered by strong trust by the public in the government, in public authorities and in the workings of the political system.

Keywords: Sweden; covid-19; pandemic; constitution; trust. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E65 E71 F52 H10 H40 H70 I10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2020-06-10
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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