The Endogenous Architecture for Two-Sided Matching Markets

Tommy Andersson, Lars Ehlers (), Ryan Tierney () and Lars-Gunnar Svensson ()
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Lars Ehlers: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: School of Economics and Management, Box 7080, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden
Ryan Tierney: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: School of Economics and Management, Box 7080, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden
Lars-Gunnar Svensson: Department of Economics, Lund University, Postal: School of Economics and Management, Box 7080, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden

No 2026:7, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We propose an endogenous architecture where a market designer can impose arbitrary restrictions on the price space, the capacity structure, the entitlement structure, and the rationing system (the architectural components). This not only generates a specific matching model, but it also endogenously generates an equilibrium concept, a domain of preference profiles, and a matching mechanism (the architectural structure). For almost any imposed restrictions, the endogenously generated mechanism is non-manipulable on the endogenously generated domain of preference profiles. The proposed endogenous architecture resolves the market design puzzle by demonstrating that seemingly disparate matching models, including many of the classic applications, are part of the same unifying architecture.

Keywords: endogenous architecture; architectural components; architectural structure; general matching framework; weak equilibrium; non-manipulability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D47 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2026-08-14
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