Harmonization of Corporate Tax Systems and its Effect on Collusive Behavior
Dirk Schindler () and
Guttorm Schjelderup ()
No 2007/8, Discussion Papers from Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science
We study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. We show that tax base harmonization reinforces collusive agreements, while harmonization of corporate tax rates may destabilize or stabilize cartels. We also find that bilateral and full harmonization to a common standard is worse from society’s point of view than unilateral harmonization to a minimum tax standard.
Keywords: Corporate tax systems; tacit collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H87 L10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-pbe and nep-pub
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Journal Article: Harmonization of Corporate Tax Systems and Its Effect on Collusive Behavior (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2007_008
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