Gibbard-Satterthwaite and an Arrovian Connection

Eivind Stensholt

No 2008/12, Discussion Papers from Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science

Abstract: A very close link of G-S, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem to Arrow’s "impossibility" theorem is shown. G-S is derived as a corollary: from a strategy-proof singleseat election method F is constructed an election method G that contradicts Arrow’s theorem.

Keywords: Preferential election methods; impossibility theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 3 pages
Date: 2008-06-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-hpe and nep-pol
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