EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Market Power in a Power Market with Transmission Constraints

Mette Helene Bjørndal, Victoria Gribkovskaia () and Kurt Jörnsten
Additional contact information
Victoria Gribkovskaia: Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics, Postal: NHH , Department of Business and Management Science, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway

No 2014/29, Discussion Papers from Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science

Abstract: In this paper we present a model for analysing the strategic behaviour of a generator and its short run implications on an electricity network with transmission constraints. The problem is formulated as a Stackelberg leader-follower game. The upper level problem is generator’s profit maximisation subject to the solution of the lower level problem of optimal power flow (OPF) solved by system operator. Strategic bidding is modelled as an iterative procedure where the supply functions of the competitive fringe are fixed while the strategic player’s bids are changed in a successive order until the bid giving maximum profit is found. This application rests on the assumption of supply function Nash equilibrium when the supplier believes that changes in his bids will not influence other actors to alter their bid functions. Numerical examples are presented on a simple triangular network.

Keywords: Electric power market; Supply function equilibria; Bilevel games; Strategic energy bidding; Irrelevant constraints (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6 pages
Date: 2014-06-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ene and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/217645 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2014_029

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science NHH, Department of Business and Management Science, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Stein Fossen ().

 
Page updated 2021-01-22
Handle: RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2014_029