Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Multinational Firm Behavior

Guttorm Schjelderup and Frank Stähler

No 2020/9, Discussion Papers from Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science

Abstract: This paper shows that Investor-State Dispute Settlements (ISDS) makes multinational firms more aggressive by increasing cost-reducing investments with the aim to enlarge the potential compensation an ISDS provision may offer. While a larger investment reduces the market distortion, it will also make potential compensations larger. Consequently, potential compensations to a foreign investor do not imply a zero-sum game. ISDS may decrease domestic welfare, in particular if the investment leads to the establishment of an export platform, and we find that even global welfare may decline.

Keywords: Investor-State Dispute Settlement; Multinational Enterprises; Foreign Direct Investment; TTIP; TPP (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F21 F23 F53 F55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2020-08-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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https://hdl.handle.net/11250/2675550 Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Investor‐state dispute settlement and multinational firm behavior (2021)
Working Paper: Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Multinational Firm Behavior (2020)
Working Paper: Investor State Dispute Settlement and Multinational Firm Behavior (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2020_009

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