Conspiracy against the public - an experiment on collusion
Åshild Auglænd Johnsen ()
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Åshild Auglænd Johnsen: School of Economics and Business, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Postal: Norwegian University of Life Sciences, School of Economics and Business, P.O. Box 5003 NMBU, N-1432 Ås, Norway
No 03-2017, Working Paper Series from Norwegian University of Life Sciences, School of Economics and Business
Cooperation is usually presented as prosocial and for the common good. But collusion is also a form of cooperation, where the gains from cooperation are at the public’s expense. How is collusion affected by this public aspect? Social preferences can mean caring for the public. But it can also mean caring for the bilateral relationship with one’s partner. This paper investigates cooperation when it is at the expense of the public, and compares it to cooperation when it is not at the public’s expense. I do so by running two versions of an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game: One version with and one without a public aspect. I find that there is more collusion when collusion is at the expense of the public conspiracy against the public.
Keywords: Infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game; Negative externality; Cooperation; Collusion; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 D62 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-exp
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:nlsseb:2017_003
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