OPEC's Response to International Climate Agreements

J. Braten and R. Golombec

Memorandum from Oslo University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies a game between a group of countries that have agreed to participate in an international climate agreement ( the signatories) and OPEC. The purpose of the signatories is to design carbon taxes that maximize their total net income, given a goal on global carbon emissions. As response to the agreement, OPEC imposes an oil tax on itd members states that maximizes OPEC's profits.

Keywords: NATURAL RESOURCES; CLIMAT; AIR POLLUTION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H3 L71 Q20 Q25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:osloec:1996_010

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