Pollution Taxation and Revenue Recycling Under Monopoly Unions

Jon Strand

Memorandum from Oslo University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider a model where a given number of firms decide on a pollution-reducing production technology, and then hire workers who subsequently form a monopoly union which sets the wage. We study the possibility of "double dividents", i.e. simultaneous reduction in pollution and increases in employment, when the pollution tax is increased, and tax revenues recycled, in alternative ways. In all cases overall pollution is then reduced.

Keywords: POLLUTION; ENTERPRISES; TECHNOLOGY; PRODUCTION; WAGES; TRADE UNIONS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 L22 Q2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 1996
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Journal Article: Pollution Taxation and Revenue Recycling under Monopoly Unions (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:osloec:1996_016

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