Strategic Location with Asymmetric Transportation Costs

Tore Nilssen () and Lars Sørgard

Memorandum from Oslo University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We extend the classical Hotelling location game with exogenously fixed prices to the case where consumers' transportation costs are asymmetric, in the sence that it is more costly for consumer to move in one direction, say on the left (towards 0), than to move to the right (towards1).

Keywords: CONSUMPTION; PRICES; INDUSTRIAL LOCATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L82 R32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:osloec:1996_035

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