Political Support for Targeted versus Universalistic Welfare Policies

Karl Ove Moene and M. Wallerstein

Memorandum from Oslo University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper compares the political support for a targeted and a universalistic welfare policy in a model in which incomes are stochastic (so that welfare policies have an insurance benefit) and unequal ex ante (so that welfare policies have a redistributive effect). With self-interested voting, low benefits may so reduce the probability of receiving benefits for the majority that the majority prefers to reduce benefits even further than zero.

Keywords: SOCIAL WELFARE; VOTING; SOCIAL POLICY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 D78 H53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:osloec:1997_017

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