Procrastination, partial naivete, and behavioral welfare analysis

Geir Asheim

No 02/2007, Memorandum from Oslo University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper has a dual purpose. First, I present a new modeling of partial naivete, and apply this to the analysis of procrastination. The decision maker is assumed to have stationary behavior and to be partially naive in the sense of perceiving that his current preferences may persist in the future. The behavioral implications of such partial naivete differ from those of related literature. Second, I suggest a general principle for welfare analysis in multi-self settings through a new application of Pareto-dominance, which is motivated by the existence of time-inconsistency and coincides with dominance relations used elsewhere in game theory. In the case of procrastination, it leads to a clear welfare conclusion: Being partially naive reduces welfare.

Keywords: Procrastination; partial naivete; time-inconsistency; game theory; behavioral welfare economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D11 D60 D74 D91 E21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2007-02-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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