Coordinating under incomplete information

Geir Asheim and Seung Han Yoo

No 22/2007, Memorandum from Oslo University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We show that, in a minimum effort game with incomplete information where player types are independently drawn, there is a largest and smallest Bayesian equilibrium, leading to the set of equilibrium payoffs (as evaluated at the interim stage) having a lattice structure. Furthermore, the range of equilibrium payoffs converges to those of the deterministic complete information version of the game, in the limit as the incomplete information vanishes. This entails that such incomplete information alone cannot explain the equilibrium selection suggested by experimental evidence.

Keywords: Minimum effort games; Coordination games; Incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2007-09-29
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