EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Choosing among Competing Blockbusters: Does the Identity of the Third-party Payer Matter for Prescribing Doctors?

Dag Morten Dalen, Enrico Sorisio and Steinar Strøm
Additional contact information
Dag Morten Dalen: Norwegian School of Management BI
Enrico Sorisio: PharmaNess and University of Oslo

No 10/2009, Memorandum from Oslo University, Department of Economics

Abstract: TNF-alpha inhibitors represent one of the most important areas of biopharmaceuticals by sales, with three blockbusters accounting for 8 % of total pharmaceutical sale in Norway. With use of a unique natural policy experiment in Norway, this paper examines to what extent the identity of the third-party payer affects doctors choice between the three available drugs. We are able to investigate to what extent the price responsiveness of prescription choices is affected when the identity of the third-party payer changes. The three dominating drugs in this market, Enbrel, Remicade, and Humira, are substitutes, but have had different and varying funding schemes - hospitals and the national insurance plan. We find that treatment choices are price responsive, and that the price response increases when the doctor’s affiliated hospital covers the cost instead of a traditional fee-for-service insurance plan.

Keywords: Pharmaceuticals; discrete choice model; funding schemes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C35 D43 I18 L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm and nep-hea
Date: 2009-05-14
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.sv.uio.no/econ/english/research/unpubl ... 009/Memo-10-2009.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Choosing among Competing Blockbusters: Does the Identity of the Third-Party Payer Matter for Prescribing Doctors? (2010) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:osloec:2009_010

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Memorandum from Oslo University, Department of Economics Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mari Strønstad Øverås ().

 
Page updated 2019-10-11
Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:2009_010