Closing the Gates? Evidence from a Natural Experiment on Physicians' Sickness Certification

Simen Markussen

No 19/2009, Memorandum from Oslo University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper exploits a Norwegian physician directed reform aimed to reduce sick-leave. Physicians were required to consider part-time sick-leave as the default treatment and – in the case of long lasting full-time sick-leave – to file a report documenting why the worker was unable to perform any work related activities. The reform had a large impact, reducing sick-leave by 18.8 percent. The main effect came from reduced spell duration – which can be directly linked to the extended documentation requirement laid on physicians within the first 8 weeks of a sick-leave spell. Physician-directed policies may be an (cost-) effective way of reducing sick-leave.

Keywords: Labor market policies; sick-leave; physicians’ gate keeping (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H53 I18 J28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2009-03-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-his
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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