Selfish Bakers, Caring Nurses? A Model of Work Motivation

Karine Nyborg and Kjell Arne Brekke

No 2008:1, HERO Online Working Paper Series from University of Oslo, Health Economics Research Programme

Abstract: Work contributes to people’s self-image in important ways. We propose a model in which individuals have a preference for being important to others. This leads to the following predictions: 1) In fully competitive markets with performance pay, behavior coincides with the standard model (bakers). 2) In jobs where e¤ort is not rewarded according to its social marginal value, behavior is more socially bene…cial than predicted by the standard model (nurses). 3) Even if unemployment bene…ts provide full income compensation, many workers’ utility strictly decreases when losing their job. 4) Similarly, many workers will prefer to work rather than to live o¤ welfare, even with full income compensation. 5) To keep shirkers out of the public sector, nurses’wages must be strictly lower than private sector income. At this wage level, however, the public sector will be too small. 6) It is possible to attract motivated workers to the public sector, without simultaneously attracting shirkers, through capital input improving nurses’opportunity to do a good job.

Keywords: Homo Oeconomicus; Work Motivation; Labour Market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I00 J00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2009-06-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-lab
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Journal Article: Selfish bakers, caring nurses? A model of work motivation (2010)
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