Profit or Patients' Health Benefit? Exploring the Heterogeneity in Physician Altruism
Geir Godager () and
Daniel Wiesen ()
No 2011:7, HERO Online Working Paper Series from University of Oslo, Health Economics Research Programme
This paper investigates physician altruism toward patients’ health benefit using behavioral data from the fully incentivized laboratory experiment of Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2011). This setup identifies both physicians’ profits and patients’ health benefit resulting from medical treatment decisions.
We estimate a random utility model applying multinomial logit regression, finding that physicians attach a positive weight on patients’ health benefit. Furthermore, physicians vary substantially in their degree of altruism. Finally, we provide some implications for the design of physician payment schemes.
Keywords: Payment incentives; Physician altruism; Health Care Quantity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 I11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-hea
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http://www.med.uio.no/helsam/forskning/nettverk/he ... erie/2011/2011_7.pdf (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Profit or patients’ health benefit? Exploring the heterogeneity in physician altruism (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:oslohe:2011_007
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