Does performance disclosure influence physicians’ medical decisions? An experimental analysis
Geir Godager (),
Tor Iversen () and
No 2013:1, HERO Online Working Paper Series from University of Oslo, Health Economics Research Programme
Pay-for-performance schemes targeting quality improvements and cost reductions in markets for medical care have become increasingly popular among health policy- makers during the last decade. Typically, such schemes attach financial incentives to a set of indicators which consist of some processed information that is believed to constitute an adequate description of the provider. Due to the asymmetric information inherent in medical markets, changes in the information structure are likely to cause substantial change to the environment in which health care providers operate. Since monitoring of physician treatment decisions is a necessary prerequisite in a pay-for performance scheme, and also an important factor influencing the information struc- ture in the market, disentangling the effect of a change in the information regime from a change in financial incentives is difficult. By means of a laboratory experiment we are able to identify the ceteris-paribus effect of a change in information regime. We find that introducing transparency, and making medical students’ treatment decisions known to their peers, have a positive impact on patients’ health benefit. The results also suggest that disclosure of physician performance increase social welfare.
Keywords: Laboratory Experiment; Asymmetric information; Payment systems; Health care provision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 I11 I12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.med.uio.no/helsam/forskning/nettverk/he ... /2013/hero2013-1.pdf (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:oslohe:2013_001
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in HERO Online Working Paper Series from University of Oslo, Health Economics Research Programme HERO / Department of Health Management and Health Economics P.O. Box 1089 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kristi Brinkmann Lenander ().