Dynamic Effects of Corruption on Offshoring

Patrik Tingvall

No 182, Ratio Working Papers from The Ratio Institute

Abstract: Abstract: For international outsourcing to occur, agents from different jurisdictions must agree on a contract. Using Swedish firm-level data, we analyze offshoring and how a firm’s choice of target country and the dynamics of offshored volumes are affected by corruption. The results suggest that corruption is a deterrent to offshoring and that internationalized firms trading with many countries use their flexibility to avoid corrupt countries. Furthermore, firms that are able to establish long-term contracts do so by starting small and successively deepening their engagements.

Keywords: corruption; offshoring; gravity; firm-level data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D22 F23 L24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2011-12-20
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