Anders Gustafsson (),
Patrik Gustavsson Tingvall () and
Daniel Halvarsson ()
Additional contact information
Anders Gustafsson: Jönköping International Business School and the Ratio Institute, Postal: Jönköping International Business School , Jönköping, Sweden, and, The Ratio Institute, P.O. Box 5095, SE-102 42 Stockholm, Sweden, http://ratio.se/medarbetare/anders-gustafsson/
Patrik Gustavsson Tingvall: The Ratio Institute & The European Institute of Japanese Studies (EIJS), Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: The Ratio Institute, P.O. Box 5095, SE-102 42 Stockholm, Sweden
Daniel Halvarsson: The Ratio Institute, Postal: The Ratio Institute, P.O. Box 5095, SE-102 42 Stockholm, Sweden, http://ratio.se/medarbetare/daniel-halvarsson/
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Anders Kärnä
No 303, Ratio Working Papers from The Ratio Institute
In this paper, we study the selection process and incentives of ﬁrms that apply for and eventually receive one or multiple governmental grants intended to stimulate innovation and growth in supported ﬁrms. The analysis departs from a rent-seeking model of heterogeneous entrepreneurs who are free to allocate their effort between production and rent-seeking. In equilibrium, highly productive entrepreneurs choose not to enter the rent-seeking contest altogether, and moderately productive entrepreneurs allocate a share of their effort both to rent-seeking and production, whereas low-productivity entrepreneurs are incentivized to allocate most, if not all, of their effort to seeking grants and can thus be called subsidy entrepreneurs. These ﬁrms also have a higher probability of receiving grants. Using detailed data over all grants administered by the three largest grant distributing agencies in Sweden, the empirical analysis suggests that supported ﬁrms tend to have relatively low productivity, higher wages, and a larger share of workers with higher education than do non-supported ﬁrms. These characteristics become more pronounced as we move from single to multiple supported ﬁrms, thus supporting the notion of subsidy entrepreneurs.
Keywords: Rent-seeking; Firm subsidies; R&D grants; Industrial policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H25 L52 O38 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ent and nep-ino
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0303
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