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Domestic and External Sovereign Debt

Paola Di Casola and Spyridon Sichlimiris
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Paola Di Casola: Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of Sweden, Postal: Sveriges Riksbank, SE-103 37 Stockholm, Sweden

No 345, Working Paper Series from Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden)

Abstract: Why do countries tend to repay their domestic and external debt, even though the legal enforcement of the sovereign debt contract is limited? Contrary to conventional wisdom, we argue that temporary market exclusion after default is costly. When the domestic financial market is characterized by a scarcity of private saving instruments, a government can partition its debt market into domestic and external segments, by restricting capital flows, to exploit its market power. The government's market power mitigates the problem of limited commitment, by making default a more costly option. Consequently, it extends the government's external debt capacity. We replicate the domestic and external sovereign debt for non-advanced economies, by unveiling their link to financial repression.

Keywords: sovereign debt; sovereign default; financial repression; financial development; capital controls (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E21 E44 E60 F34 F38 G15 G18 H63 O16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac and nep-opm
Date: 2017-11-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:rbnkwp:0345

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