EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Electoral Cycles in Macroeconomic Forecasts

Davide Cipullo and André Reslow ()
Additional contact information
André Reslow: Payments Department, Central Bank of Sweden, Postal: Sveriges Riksbank, SE-103 37 Stockholm, Sweden

No 415, Working Paper Series from Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden)

Abstract: This paper documents the existence of electoral cycles in GDP growth forecasts released by governments. In a theoretical model of political selection, we show that governments release overly optimistic GDP growth forecasts ahead of elections to increase the reelection probability. The bias arises from lack of commitment if voters are rational and from manipulation of voters’ beliefs if they do not expect the incumbent to be biased. Using high-frequency forecaster-level data from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Sweden, we document that governments overestimate short-term real GDP growth by 0.1–0.3 percentage points.

Keywords: Electoral Cycles; Political Selection; Voting; Macroeconomic Forecasting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 E37 H68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 67 pages
Date: 2022-08-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.riksbank.se/globalassets/media/rapport ... onomic-forecasts.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Electoral cycles in macroeconomic forecasts (2022) Downloads
Working Paper: Electoral Cycles in Macroeconomic Forecasts (2021) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:rbnkwp:0415

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series from Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden) Sveriges Riksbank, SE-103 37 Stockholm, Sweden. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lena Löfgren ().

 
Page updated 2024-09-09
Handle: RePEc:hhs:rbnkwp:0415