Constrained welfare egalitarianism in surplus-sharing problems

Pedro Calleja (), Francesc Llerena () and Peter Sudhölter
Additional contact information
Pedro Calleja: Departament de Matemàtica Econòmica, Postal: Financera i Actuarial, BEAT, Universitat de Barcelona
Francesc Llerena: Departament de Gestió dEmpreses, Postal: CREIP, Universitat Rovira i Virgili at Reus
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Francesc Llerena Garrés

No 1/2020, Discussion Papers on Economics from University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics

Abstract: We introduce the constrained egalitarian surplus-sharing rule fCE, which distributes an amount of a divisible resource so that the poorer agents’ resulting payoffs become equal but not larger than any remaining agent’s status quo payoff. We show that fCE is characterized by Pareto optimality, nonnegativity, path independence, and less first, a new property requiring that an agent does not gain if her status quo payoff exceeds that of another agent by the surplus. We provide two additional characterizations weakening less first and employing consistency, a classical invariance property with respect to changes of population. We investigate the effects of egalitarian principles in the setting of transferable utility (TU) games. A single-valued solution for TU games is said to support constrained welfare egalitarianism if it distributes any increment of the worth of the grand coalition according to fCE. We show that the set of Pareto optimal single-valued solutions that support fCE is characterized by means of aggregate monotonicity and bounded pairwise fairness, resembling less first.

Keywords: Surplus-sharing problem; egalitarianism; Lorenz domination; TU game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2020-01-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.sdu.dk/-/media/files/om_sdu/institutte ... _2020/dpbe1_2020.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Constrained welfare egalitarianism in surplus-sharing problems (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2020_001

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers on Economics from University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics Department of Economics, University of Southern Denmark, Campusvej 55, DK-5230 Odense M, Denmark. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Astrid Holm Nielsen ().