The Evolution of Security Designs

Thomas Noe (), Michael J. Rebello and Jun Wang ()
Additional contact information
Michael J. Rebello: A.B. Freeman School of Business, Postal: Tulane University, St. Charles Ave., New Orleans, LA 70118, USA
Jun Wang: Baruch College, Postal: One Bernard Baruch Way, Box B10-225, New York, NY 10010, USA

No 26, SIFR Research Report Series from Institute for Financial Research

Abstract: This paper embeds security design in a model of evolutionary learning. We consider a competitive and perfect financial market where agents, as in Allen and Gale (1988), have heterogeneous valuations for cash flows. Our point of departure is that, instead of assuming that agents are endowed with rational expectations, we model their behavior as the product of adaptive learning. Our results demonstrate that adaptive learning profoundly affects security design. Securities are mispriced even in the long run and optional designs trade off underpricing against intrinsic value maximization. The evolutionary dominant security design calls for issuing securities that engender large losses with a small but positive probability, and otherwise produce stable payoffs. These designs are almost the exact opposite of the pure state claims which are optimal in the rational expectations framework but are roughly consistent with what one would expect given the decision making heuristics documented in the behavioural economics literature.

Keywords: Corporate financing; Adaptive learning; Genetic algorithm; Security choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C45 D83 G12 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2004-09-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-fin
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Evolution of Security Designs (2006)
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