The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Sentencing Outcomes

Patricio Dominguez () and Leopoldo Lazcano ()
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Patricio Dominguez: Pontificia Universidad Católica, Chile, https://sites.google.com/site/pdomingr/
Leopoldo Lazcano: Swedish Institute for Social Research, Postal: SOFI, Stockholm University, SE-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden

No 8/2025, SOFI Working Papers in Labour Economics from Stockholm University, Swedish Institute for Social Research

Abstract: Pretrial detention accounts for an important share of the prison population around the globe. We examine its impact on sentencing outcomes in Chile’s criminal justice system, where plea bargaining is a limited prosecution tool. We find that pretrial detention increases conviction probability from 53 to 76 percent. We then assess how a reform facilitating prosecution for a specific set of crimes (robberies) alters this effect. We observe a substantial increase in the impact of pretrial detention on conviction for robbery-related crimes and no relevant changes for others. These findings highlight pretrial detention’s role in shaping criminal justice outcomes.

Keywords: pretrial detention; sentencing outcomes; plea bargaining; judge-IV design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C26 D01 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 57 pages
Date: 2025-05-15
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