Game-Theoretic Perspectives on Financial Crises

Jonathan Welburn () and Kjell Hausken

No 2014/22, UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance from University of Stavanger

Abstract: Global financial crises have revealed the systemic risk posed by economic contagion. We provide perspectives on the formulation of a game between countries, central banks, banks, firms, households, and financial intergovernmental organizations to model the dynamics between players. We model strategic choices, strategy sets, and utility functions to provide new tools to handle financial crises. The model is illustrated with examples using sensitivity analysis. One country, and two countries, are considered, and we simulate the impacts of random shocks under a variety of assumptions.

Keywords: Contagion; financial risk; game theory; bank; central bank; country; firms; households; intergovernmental organization; consumption; production; capital; default; borrow; lend; financial friction; shock; sensitivity analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2014-12-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/8078351/uis_wp ... _welburn_hausken.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:stavef:2014_022

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance from University of Stavanger University of Stavanger, NO-4036 Stavanger, Norway. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bernt Arne Odegaard ().