A Note on Price and Quantity Competition in Differentiated Oligopolies

Jonas Häckner ()

No 1999:9, Research Papers in Economics from Stockholm University, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this not we show that the results developed in Singh and Vives (1984) are sensitive to the duopoly assumtion (Rand Journal of Economics 15, 546-554). If there are more than two firms, prices may be higher under price competition than unde quantity competition. This will be the case if quality differences are large and goods are complements. If goods are substitutes, high-quality fims may earn higher profits unde price competion than under quantity competition. Hence, it is not evident which kind of competition is more efficient.

Keywords: Product Differentiation; Oligopoly; Cournot; Bertrand (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 1999-08-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2000, pages 233-239.

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: A Note on Price and Quantity Competition in Differentiated Oligopolies (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:1999_0009

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Research Papers in Economics from Stockholm University, Department of Economics Department of Economics, Stockholm, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Anne Jensen ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).