Tax Evasion: A Real Option Approach

Tomas Forsfält
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Tomas Forsfält: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University, Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden, http://www.ne.su.se

No 1999:19, Research Papers in Economics from Stockholm University, Department of Economics

Abstract: A theoretical model of excise tax evasion is developed in this paper. The dynamics of a change in tax policy is derived, under the assumption that consumers benefit from a lower price when entering a "black market". However, entry also impose a sunk cost, which gives rise to asymmetric effects and persistence effects on both aggregate demand and on tax revenues. An increase in the tax rate instantaneously brings more entrants into the black market, whereas a tax cut has no short-run effects on the fraction of the population that has access to the black market.

Keywords: excise tax; real option; social norm; tax evasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 1999-11-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-pub
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:1999_0019

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