Tax Avoidance, Redistribution and Voting

Jesper Roine ()

No 2000:1, Research Papers in Economics from Stockholm University, Department of Economics

Abstract: The main question addressed in this paper is how the possibility of investing in tax avoidance affects voting and redistributive outcomes in an economy where the tax rate is determined by a majority vote and taxes go to lump-sum redistribution. The outcome depends on the timing and efficiency of tax avoidance. It is shown that in all cases those who invest in tax avoidance pay proportionally less in taxes than others. Politically two cases can be distinguished. One where the population is divided accordingly to income and the median income earner is decisive, and one where the most affluent form a coalition with those with low income and the decisive voter has lower than median income.

Keywords: Tax Avoidance; Redistribution; Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H20 H23 H24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 1999-11-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic, nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-pub
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2000_0001

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