Deductive reasoning in Extensive Games

Geir Asheim

No 2000:7, Research Papers in Economics from Stockholm University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We justify the application to extensive games of the concept of ‘fully permissible sets’, which corresponds to choice sets when there is common certain belief of the event that each player prefer one strategy to another if and only if the former weakly dominates the latter on the set of all opponent strategies or on the union of the choice sets that are deemed possible for the opponent. he e tensive games considered illustrate how our concept yields support to forward induction, without necessarily promoting backward induction.

Keywords: Extensive Game; Deductive reasoning; backward induction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2000-02-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ind
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Deductive Reasoning in Extensive Games (2003)
Working Paper: Deductive reasoning in extensive games (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2000_0007

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