Incentive and Incarceration Effects in a General Equilibrium Model of Crime
Mats Persson and
Claes-Henric Siven
Additional contact information
Claes-Henric Siven: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University, Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden, http://www.ne.su.se
No 2001:6, Research Papers in Economics from Stockholm University, Department of Economics
Abstract:
An intertemporal general equilibrium model of criminal behavior is used to analyze the effect on crime of changing policy parameters. The policy parameters are the length of the prison term, the severity of punishment, and the amount of police resources. The number of crimes in society can be decomposed into an incentive part, an incarceration part, and a crime competition part. The magnitudes of these three components are studied by means of empirical data from England and the US.
Keywords: Crime; Genreal Equilibrium; Incarceration; Incarceration effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2001-02-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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http://www2.ne.su.se/paper/wp01_06.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Incentive and incarceration effects in a general equilibrium model of crime (2006) 
Working Paper: Incentive and Incarceration Effects in a General Equilibrium Model of Crime (2001) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2001_0006
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