Comparing Permit Allocation Options: The Main Points

Peter Bohm
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Peter Bohm: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University, Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden, http://www.ne.su.se

No 2002:11, Research Papers in Economics from Stockholm University, Department of Economics

Abstract: In discussions about the policy design of domestic emission trading, e.g., when implementing the

Kyoto Protocol, the two permit allocation alternatives ­ auctioning and allocation gratis

(grandfathering) ­ are often pitted against each other as representing utopian cost-effectiveness and

political realism, respectively. In this note, an attempt is made to extract the main points of a

comparison between the two options with respect to efficiency and distribution.

Keywords: Domestic carbon emissions trading; permit allocation; grandfathering; auctioning; cost effectiveness; Kyoto protocol (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q25 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7 pages
Date: 2002-04-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-mic and nep-res
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2002_0011

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