Decentralising Public Goods Production

Michael Lundholm ()

No 2004:6, Research Papers in Economics from Stockholm University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Decentralised decisions, to a bureau with a given budget, about the production of public goods is analysed within a general equilibrium model with a representative agent and no pure profits. It is shown that decentralisation (i) does not necessarily imply aggregate production effciency and (ii) need not be optimal even if all public goods are neutral. Also, cost benefit criteria are derived and the marginal cost of public funds is characterised.

Keywords: Cost benefit criteria; marginal cost of public funds; production effciency; delegation; decentralisation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 H41 H43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2004-05-24
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http://www2.ne.su.se/paper/wp04_06.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Decentralizing Public Goods Production (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2004_0006

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