Optimal Mix of Price and Quantity Regulation under Uncertainty

Svante Mandell

No 2004:12, Research Papers in Economics from Stockholm University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper takes on the issue of ‘Prices vs. Quantities’, see Weitzman (1974), applied to environmental regulations under uncertainty. It is shown that, from an efficiency point of view, it is generally preferable to divide the economy into two parts, one regulated through a tax and the other through cap-and-trade, rather than letting it be subject to either of these regulation mechanisms. This may be so even when the latter alternatives are cost effective while the former is not. Particular interest is devoted to determining the optimal size of each sector. Generally, a steeper marginal abatement cost function relative to the marginal abatement benefit function implies that a larger part of the economy should be taxed.

Keywords: regulation; uncertainty; emissions tax; tradable permits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H23 L51 Q28 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2004-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2004_0012

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