Democracy as a Middle Ground: A Uni…ed Theory of Development and Political Regimes

Anna Larsson () and Stephen Parente ()
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Anna Larsson: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University, Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden, http://people.su.se/~annla/
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Anna Seim

No 2010:7, Research Papers in Economics from Stockholm University, Department of Economics

Abstract: A large literature documents that autocratic regimes have not, on average, outperformed democratic regimes, although they do display greater variance in economic performance. At the same time, no long-lived autocracy currently is rich whereas every long-lived democracy is. This paper puts forth a theory to account for these observations. The theory rests on the idea that autocratic leaders are heterogenous in their preferences and the idea that special interest groups can successfully lobby a democratic regime for policies that delay industrialization. We show that an elite landed class chooses to democratize society only after the economy has accumulated enough wealth.

Keywords: Autocracy; Democracy; Landed Elites; Growth Miracles; Vested Interests (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O10 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2010-05-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-evo and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2010_0007

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