Political influence on environmental sanction charges in Swedish municipalities

Eric Sjöberg

No 2012:6, Research Papers in Economics from Stockholm University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Earlier literature has established that enforcement of the Swedish Environmental Code varies greatly across municipalities. This is problematic due to differences in application of the law and from an efficiency perspective. This study shows that the variation can to some extent be explained by the ruling political coalition. Green Party representation in the ruling coalition is estimated to have a positive effect on the number of environmental sanction charges handed out by the local environmental offices. A difference in differences approach and IV- estimation is used to address the endogeneity issues. I argue for the random distribution of local party representation in the municipal council and use the absence of local parties as an instrument for Green Party representation in the ruling coalition.

Keywords: Environmental code; Decentralization; Law enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K32 K42 Q01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2012-06-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-law and nep-res
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2012_0006

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