Fiscal Externalities and Asymmetric Information in an Economic Federation

Thomas Aronsson () and Magnus Wikström ()
Additional contact information
Thomas Aronsson: Department of Economics, Umeå University, Postal: S 901 87 Umeå, Sweden

No 516, Umeå Economic Studies from Umeå University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes optimal taxation and provision of public goods in an economy where tax and expenditure decisions are being made by both central and local governments. The main contribution of the paper is to address the implications of informational asymmetries, such that the central government cannot fully observe differences in local preferences. In case the differences across localities only refer to their preferences for local public goods, we show how the central government can implement the socially optimal resource allocation by means of subsidizing local provision of the federal (or central) public good. We also examine the welfare effects of such subsidies, when the socially optimal resource allocation is not a feasible policy option.

Keywords: Fiscal externalities; informational asymmetries: optimal taxation and provision of public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D62 D82 H21 H71 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 1999-10-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ.umu.se/DownloadAsset.action?conten ... Id=3&assetKey=ues516 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:umnees:0516

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Umeå Economic Studies from Umeå University, Department of Economics Department of Economics, Umeå University, S-901 87 Umeå, Sweden. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by David Skog ().