The Political Economy of Public Employment Programs

Peter Fredriksson

No 1997:6, Working Paper Series from Uppsala University, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we study the consequences of endogenous active labor market policies. In particular it is assumed that all viable policies have to please the employed majority. The main objective is to seek the answer to the following question: In what sense does the political equilibrium deviate from the welfare optimum? We find that the political process yields excessive program activity under highly plausible circumstances. Thereason for this deviation from constrained efficiency is that active labor market policy inflicts costs on firms that are ignored by the employed.

Keywords: Political economy; labor market programs; efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 H21 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 1997-01-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-ltv, nep-mic, nep-pbe, nep-pke, nep-pol and nep-pub
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Journal of Public Economics, 1999, pages 487-504.

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: The political economy of public employment programs (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:uunewp:1997_006

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series from Uppsala University, Department of Economics Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P. O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ulrika Öjdeby ().