Post Mortem Reputation, Compensatory Gifts and Equal Bequests

Michael Lundholm () and Henry Ohlsson

No 1999:3, Working Paper Series from Uppsala University, Department of Economics

Abstract: The empirical evidence suggests that parents use inter vivos gifts (i.e., transfers of tangible and financial property) to compensate less well off children whereas post mortem bequests are divided equally among siblings. We study a theoretical model assuming, first, that the amounts given is private information, only known to the donor and the donee, while the amounts bequeathed is public information. Second, we assume that parents care about the reputation that their bequest behavior will leave them after their death. More specifically, this reputation is deteriorating in the difference in amounts inherited. We show that, given optimal choice of altruistic parents is compensatory gifts and equal bequests.

Keywords: altruism; bequests; inheritances; gifts; equal division; post mortem reputation; social norm; information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D10 D31 D63 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6 pages
Date: 1999-01-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Published in Economics Letters, 2000, pages 165-171.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Post mortem reputation, compensatory gifts and equal bequests (2000)
Working Paper: Post Mortem Reputation, Compensatory Gifts and Equal Bequests (1999)
Working Paper: Post Mortem Reputation, Compensatory Gifts and Equal Bequests (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:uunewp:1999_003

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