Moral, the Informal Sector, and Unemployment

Ann-Sofie Kolm and Birthe Larsen

No 2001:9, Working Paper Series from Uppsala University, Department of Economics

Abstract: While examining the macroeconomic effects of increased government control of the informal sector, this paper develops a two-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions, and heterogeneous workers in terms of moral. This facilitates an analysis of how wage setting and unemployment is affected by punishment policies, which is ignored in the previous literature.

Keywords: Tax evasion; wage bargains; matching; moral; unemployment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2001-02-16
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: Moral, The Informal Sector, and Unemployment (2001)
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