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When Should an Incumbent Be Obliged to Share its Infrastructure with an Entrant Under the General Competition Rules?

Mats Bergman ()
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Mats Bergman: Göteborg University, Postal: Department of Economics, Göteborg University, P.O. Box 640, SE-405 30 Göteborg, Sweden

No 2003:25, Working Paper Series from Uppsala University, Department of Economics

Abstract: According to the essential facilities doctrine, competition law requires an infrastructural monopoly to provide access. Under the ”Bronner criterion”, proposed by the EC Court, the doctrine is only applicable when an infrastructural duopoly is non-viable. This paper uses a simple model to illustrate that, from a welfare point-of-view, the Bronner criterion may provide too little monopoly protection for the incumbent in high-risk new markets, while requiring too much investments from the entrant in moderately mature markets.

Keywords: Infrastructure; access regulation; competition law; antitrust; Bronner (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L43 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2003-09-15
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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