Political budget cycles with informed voters: evidence from Italy

Luca Repetto

No 2016:6, Working Paper Series from Uppsala University, Department of Economics

Abstract: I exploit a reform that required Italian municipalities to disclose their balance sheets before elections to study whether having more informed voters aects the political budget cycle. To start, investment spending in the year before elections is 28.5% higher than in the election year and this increase is mainly nanced with new debt and sales of public assets. Taking advantage of the staggered timing of municipal elections, I estimate that the reform reduced this pre-electoral spending increase by around one-third. I also study the role of local newspapers in disseminating municipal nancial information to voters and I nd that the reduction in spending after the reform is twice as strong in provinces with above-median local newspapers sales per capita. I interpret these results as evidence that mayors react to more informed voters by reducing spending manipulation.

Keywords: Information; Political budget cycles; accountability; Italian municipalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 E62 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 2016-05-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Political Budget Cycles with Informed Voters: Evidence from Italy (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2016_006

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